Summary. This paper explores the endogenous emergence of wage bargaining institutions in a union-oligopoly framework. Technological asymmetries among firms are shown to be the driving force for the emergence of alternative wage bargaining centralization structures that are observable in real life. As wage deals at the sector-level obtain the consensus of all unions and the efficient firms, a regulator has an incentive to authorize those deals by activating/establishing a Minimum Sectoral Wage Institution (MSWI). If productivity differences are high enough, wage setting above the established wage floor may subsequently occur in efficient firms. Otherwise, a completely centralized wage bargaining structure emerges and the sector-level wage deal is simply confirmed as the firms' wage rate. If, however, productivity asymmetries are rather insignificant, firms and unions have conflicting interests and a completely decentralized wage bargaining regime prevails in equilibrium.
Introduction
Contemporary labor market institutions display substantial variability regarding the level of wage negotiations. In USA, Canada and Japan, collective and/or individual bargaining over wages occurs at the firm-level alone. In Europe, however, wage negotiations are often conducted at various levels. They are typically centralized at the sector-level in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, France and Portugal, while they are centralized at both the national and the sector-level in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, collective bargaining over wages is carried out at all three levels (national-, sector-, and firm-level) in Belgium and Greece. On the other hand, wage negotiations are mainly decentralized, at the firm-level, in UK and Ireland (see e.g. Layard et al. [20] ; Hartog and Theeuwes [17] ). Under this light, an interesting two-fold question arises: why such a striking cross-country variety of wage bargaining institutions prevails, and how do these alternative institutional structures emerge?
Economic theory has, up to date, hardly addressed such inquiries. Yet, the received literature has assigned a crucial role on the degree of wage centralization since it has been shown to have a significant impact on the equilibrium outcomes in unionized labor markets (see e.g. Davidson [8] ; Dorwick [11] ; Corneo [7] ; Padilla et al. [25] ) If, for instance, firm-union bargaining over wages takes place independently at the firm level, wages are typically lower and aggregate employment higher than under wage centralization at the sector level.
1 The bulk of the literature on the bargaining structure and minimum wages, however, treats wage centralization as an exogenous institutional feature.
2 Moreover, only the cases of complete centralization or complete decentralization are explicitly considered (see e.g. Vannetelbosch [32] ; Grandner [13]), while there has been little attempt to explain the circumstances under which each of those two polar cases emerges, or to provide reasons about why collective firm-union wage agreements may be carried out at various levels (see e.g. Yang [34] ).
In this paper we develop a framework of endogenous determination of alternative wage bargaining structures that builds on a fundamental game-theoretic postulate: a collective arrangement can be established only if a "winning" coalition among the agents involved in that arrangement finds its establishment beneficial. In the context of unionized labor markets, it is clear that the firms and the unions in a particular sector are the agents who are directly involved in the issue of the determination of the level of wage bargaining in that sector. Yet, since in real life an official institutional resolution/amendment is necessary for the authorization of any collective arrangement, we claim that the level of wage bargaining is decided upon by a regulator who however takes into account whether, or not, his decision would be approved by a majority of those agents. It is only under these circumstances
